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DETERMINATIVE LAW
Those provisions of the Utah Constitution and Utah statutes
cited herein are reproduced in the Addendum.
INTRODUCTION
It is not the intent of this Reply Brief to rebut point by
point the arguments made by the state. Appellant stands on the
argument of the principal brief as being sufficient to show that
his sentence should be vacated.
This Reply Brief is intended to respond in general themes to
assist the court in remaining focused on the issues presented.
For example, it is shown herein that the various procedural
objections of the state to the presentation of the issues are
misplaced and that this court may fully consider the substantive
points raised.
This Reply Brief shows that the substantive questions of
ineffective assistance of counsel have not been effectively
rebutted by the state.

When one adds up the numerous omissions

of the original counsel, it is seen# taken as a total picture,
that Mr. Parsons did not receive effective assistance of counsel
at a level required by the federal and Utah Constitutions.
The legal framework is in place for this court to hold that
representation in a habeas corpus proceeding arising from a
capital offense should be provided by the state for an indigent
petitioner.

With the framework in place, all that is needed is

for this court to make a fundamental public policy decision and

1

thereby breathe life into the applicable constitutional provisions protecting accused persons.
ARGUMENT
A.

ALL OF APPELLANT'S ISSUES STAND PROCEDURALLY
CORRECT BEFORE THE COURT FOR DECISION

The state weaves through its brief several claims that
certain issues of the appellant are not appropriately before this
court because of procedural defects.

A close examination of the

record shows that Parsons has all of his issues properly before
this court for decision.
The state argues first at page 7 of its brief that the issue
of whether the two depositions taken by the state were taken in
violation of fundamental rights is not properly before the court.
The state correctly points out that an accused is required to
raise all appropriate issues in the original direct appeal absent
unusual circumstances justifying the failure to raise the issue.
The state further correctly points out that the unusual circumstances exception is raised when claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel are made and the same counsel represented the accused
at trial and on appeal.

Gerrish v. Barnes, 202 Utah Adv. Rep. 7

(Utah 1992).
The record shows that in the Amended Complaint for Extraordinary Writ —

Habeas Corpus, Parsons alleged that depositions

were taken in violation of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
and constitute a denial of the defendant's right to due process,
denial of the right to confront witnesses, and denial of right to
2

effective assistance of counsel at all critical stages of the
criminal proceeding.

Third Dist. R., p. 17. A reading of this

Amended Complaint shows that this issue was raised in the context
of ineffective assistance of counsel and, admittedly, interwoven
with the direct claim of violation of constitutional rights.
Parsons later filed a Statement of Claims with the Third
District Court which further explained, at page 4, that claims
were made of constitutional violations in the taking of these
depositions.

Third Dist. R., p. 113. The issues were raised

again in the Trial Brief in the Third District Court and were
considered over the objection of the state at that time. Third
Dist. R., p. 188.
Summarizing the record, Parsons raised in the Third District
Court the taking of key depositions as a direct violation of
certain constitutional rights and as evidence of ineffective
assistance of counsel for the failure to object to the taking of
the depositions.

The unusual circumstances required by Gerrish

are raised by this proceeding.

First, if the court agrees that

the taking of sworn depositions of witnesses after charging
constitutes a violation of constitutional rights, an obvious
injustice or substantial denial of a constitutional right occurred in the original trial court.

Second, where the same

counsel represented Mr. Parsons at trial and at appeal, failure
to make a timely objection to the taking of these depositions is
evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel which may be
considered in a habeas corpus proceeding.
3

The second major procedural objection the state makes at
page 44 of its brief is that Parsons abandoned his federal
arguments in the trial court concerning whether he is entitled to
representation at the expense of the government.

The state

supports its objection by referring to a Memorandum in Opposition
to a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Parsons in
which he focuses his argument on Utah constitutional principles.
Third Dist. R., p. 92. An examination of the record shows that
Parsons always claimed that he had a right to costs, expenses,
and fees for counsel and investigators under the United States
Constitution.
initially.

His Amended Complaint, at page 5, so stated

Third Dist. R., p. 21. The Memorandum was a response

to a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the question of
payment of attorney's fees.

Third Dist. R., p. 46. The next

consideration of the point is the final ruling of the trial court
which does not state whether the court considered federal constitutional issues. Third Dist. R., p. 280.
In summary, Parsons raised the federal constitution in
claiming he was entitled to have counsel provided in a habeas
corpus proceeding, the state attacked the issue by summary
judgment to which response was made primarily in light of the
state constitution, and the motion was denied.

The federal

questions pled in the Amended Complaint were still before the
court and denied without mentioning either the federal or state
constitutions.

There is no real evidence of an abandonment of

reliance upon the federal constitution.
4

While the trial court did not make clear to what extent it
considered the federal constitution on this point, it is apparent
that the issue is properly before the court now.

This court has

long held that an exception to the general rule that issues not
raised at trial cannot be raised later is when constitutional
issues are raised when a person's liberty is at stake.
City Council of Riverton, 639 P.2d 172 (Utah 1981).

Pratt v.

The Utah

Court of Appeals has more recently affirmed that rule by stating
constitutional issues may be raised for the first time on appeal
where liberty is at stake.

Johnson v. Department of Employment

Sec., 782 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1989).
The objection of the state to the raising of federal constitutional issues at this point is not well taken because such
issues could have been raised even if Parsons had not pled them
at the trial court level.
B.

DEPOSITIONS TAKEN REMAIN A PER SE VIOLATION OF RIGHTS

Parsons raises on appeal issues addressing two depositions
taken by the prosecutor after Parsons was charged and without the
presence of Parsons or his counsel. The arguments made in the
principal brief are not repeated here.
A reading of the state's brief shows that its response does
not meet squarely the constitutional arguments but, instead, is
merely a relabeling of the depositions as mere sworn statements
given to the prosecutor.

The effect of this is to reduce the

proceeding from one of formality to nothing more than a casual
recorded interview with prosecutors and police officers.
5

Parsons does not claim that a prosecutor or police officer
may not interview a key witness prior to trial.

A fundamental

error occurs here because of the taking of an oath.

The taking

of an oath constitutes a legal turning point at which penalties
under the law attach for willful misstatements.

Spanaler v.

District Court of Salt Lake County, 104 Utah 584, 140 P.2d 755
(Utah 1943) .
The Utah Code is particularly instructive where it provides
in §68-3-12(2)(k) that in construing statutes, courts are to
consider that every oral statement under oath is embraced in the
term "testify".

Put another way# the Utah Code is defining

testify as statements made under oath.

These depositions are,

then, "testimony".
The penalty which attaches is found in §76-8-502 which
provides for punishment of a second degree felony for false
material statements under oath.
One searches the law in vain for penalties attaching to
misstatements made to a prosecutor in an informal interview.

One

also searches the law in vain to find authority for a prosecutor
to take a "sworn statement" outside of the rules of criminal
procedure.
In light of the significance of the giving of an oath, the
original argument made by Parsons remains unrefuted.

Depositions

in this case were taken at a critical stage of the proceeding
because charging had occurred.

Witness testimony was taken under

circumstances in which their stories were locked in without
6

benefit of cross-examination.

The chilling effect on a witness

later at trial to alter their statement in any way is obvious.
The claim by the state that the defense counsel used the
statements in his cross-examination is without legal significance.

The fact that the defense counsel later used them at

trial for questioning purposes does not mean that witnesses were
effectively confronted and cross-examined when their testimony
was originally taken.

The argument is a red herring that fails

to focus on the principal issue that the constitutional damage
had already been done when the depositions were taken after
charging, under oath, and without notice to and attendance of the
defense counsel.
Finally, the state's argument that Parsons be required to
show that the witnesses were somehow tainted is again misplaced.
The analogous situation of tainted line-ups carries no such
requirement.

Line-ups are to either be done constitutionally

correct or the identification is suppressed.

There is no subjec-

tive questioning of the witness if there is an objective showing
that the actual procedures used were inappropriate.
v. McCumberP 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980).
defect is present here.

See, State

The same constitutional

The taking of a deposition without

confrontation through cross-examination similarly can be presumed
to taint the proceeding because of the potential second degree
felony chargeable to the witness that changes testimony later.

7

The failure to object at trial to this procedure was ineffective assistance of counsel and, standing alone, justifies the
vacating of the sentence of death.
C.

THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS
HAVE NOT BEEN REFUTED

Parsons has adequately stated his claims concerning the
ineffective assistance of counsel and a point by point response
to the state is unnecessary.

Some general responses are offered,

however, where considered helpful to the court.
1.

Investigation

The state argues that defense counsel made a sufficient
pretrial investigation contrary to the claim of Parsons. There
is considerable irony in the state's reliance for this argument
on page 24 of its brief on statements addressing the issue of
whether the victim had homosexual tendencies taken from the
depositions which Parsons claims were constitutionally deficient.
The fact remains that the record shows that defense counsel did
minimal effort to make inquiry into this key area of defense and
Parsons does not know what an adequate investigation would have
revealed.

The state's response is merely to argue the evidence

presented shows the victim did not have homosexual orientation
and begs the substantive issue of whether a thorough investigation should have been made.
Mr. Parsons is being sent to his death not knowing what
information was available because defense counsel did not thor-

8

oughly investigate the fundamental facts of his basic mitigating
defense.

This inadequate representation should not be condoned.
2.

Jury Voir

Dire

The state makes an overstatement of considerable importance
on page 37 of its brief.

The state argues that a sufficient

questioning of the potential jurors was made and goes on to state
that each juror was asked what information had been received
about the case.

In fact, none of the jurors was asked what they

had heard about the case.

That is the very purpose that Parsons

lists the transcript pages of the voir

dire

of each juror on page

35 of his principal brief.
This failure to ask the jurors what they heard is at the
heart of the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. A
reading of the voir

dire

of each of those jurors shows that

nobody asked them what information they had received.

They made

only general statements that they had read about the case in the
newspaper or heard about it in other local media but never
explained exactly what they had heard.
What a particular juror had heard is far more important to
know than the mere fact that they had heard something.

Absent

that specific inquiry there can be no determination of whether
opinions were formed and conclusions drawn on information outside
of the evidence. This oversight of basic inquiry is additional
evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel.

9

3.

Discovery Request

The state argues at page 31 of its brief that the failure of
a defense counsel to make a formal request for discovery does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

This court has not

directly addressed the question but the state cites the recent
case of State v. Vigilr 840 P.2d 788 (Utah App. 1992), for the
proposition that failure to file a discovery request is not per
se ineffective assistance of counsel.
Vigil involved the claim on direct appeal of ineffective
assistance of counsel for failure of the defense counsel to file
a discovery request with the prosecutor.

The Court of Appeals

refused to find ineffective assistance of counsel where the
record was clear that the defense counsel conducted an adequate
and thorough investigation.
Vigil does not apply to Parsons for two reasons.

The first,

discussed in considerable detail in the principal brief, is that
his defense counsel did not conduct an adequate investigation.
As explained in the principal brief, Iron County made available
an investigator at the expense of the county which was never
used.

No legal obligation except the general obligation to

disclose exculpatory evidence was imposed on the prosecutor to
produce evidence.

Vigil is distinguishable because of this lack

of investigation.
The second reason Vigil does not apply is that it appears to
have been decided wrongly by the Court of Appeals.

Again, as

explained in the original brief, Utah has no Supreme Court case
10

on point.

The closest one can come is State v. Tempiinf 805 P.2d

182 (Utah 1990), which stands for the proposition that failure to
conduct an investigation is not a tactical decision and constitutes per se ineffective assistance of counsel. While acknowledging Tempiin. Vigil really does not follow its holding by
finding that a motion for discovery does not constitute per se
ineffective assistance of counsel.

It is hard to harmonize the

Tempiin requirement that counsel actively pursue investigation
with the Vigil holding that the sending of a short request for
discovery to the prosecutor may be excused.

Without repeating

the arguments made in the principal brief, this court should hold
that failure to conduct the simple act of formal discovery,
especially in a capital homicide case, is per se ineffective
assistance of counsel.
4.

Special Verdict Form

The state responds to the Parsons claim that the Special
Verdict Form was constitutionally defective by several responses.
The first response is that this court approved the Special
Verdict Form in the original appeal.
While the original appeal did consider some issues concerning jury instructions, an examination of the case shows that the
issue presented here was not raised.
P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989).

See, State v. Parsons, 781

The thrust of the argument made here is

that the original defense counsel missed certain key issues
which, if properly presented to this court, would have shown that
there were serious defects in the Special Verdict Form and the
11

way it interacted with the jury instructions•

Put simply, this

court has not ruled on the issues presented in this proceeding.
The state next argues that the jury is free to consider
generally aggravating circumstances when making a determination
of penalty and that the inclusion of the aggravating circumstance
of acting for pecuniary gain was not prejudicial.
In a pure and abstract sense, the state's argument is
correct.

That is, a jury is free to consider a number of aggra-

vating circumstances, including those not contained in the
statute defining murder in the first degree, for purposes of
assessing the penalty.

The argument breaks down here because of

the actual structure of the verdict form and the jury instructions.
At the risk of repeating the argument in the principal
brief, the court is again invited to read jury instructions 14,
15, 15A, 18, and 27 with the Special Verdict Form.

Fifth Dist.

R., pp. 267 - 270, 273 - 274, 283 - 284, 297 - 299.

The court

will see that the instructions generally tell the jury that if
they find any of the aggravating circumstances listed on the
Special Verdict Form that the penalty of death is justified.

The

problem is, of course, that the pecuniary gain aggravating
circumstance is actually a duplication of the robbery aggravating
circumstance.

Additionally, the aggravating circumstance that

Mr. Parsons was a person on parole in possession of a firearm is
not a justification, standing alone, for the imposition of
capital punishment stated by §76-5-202.
12

The practical effect of listing aggravating circumstances on
a special verdict form is to enhance the likelihood of finding
for the death penalty for a juror that has not studied the Utah
Code,

If one adopts the state's argument, the trial court just

as easily could have put on the Special Verdict Form that the
jury could consider that the defendant stole a motorcycle once,
violated the law of hitchhiking, etc.

While other wrongful acts

may bear on the question of the character and history of the
accused in weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
placing them on a special verdict form clearly elevates their
importance in the total mix of the decision.

The implication of

the Special Verdict Form is that the jury, in theory, could find
that Parsons did not do the killing in the course of an aggravated robbery nor for pecuniary gain but could still impose the
death penalty for being a person on parole in possession of a
firearm when a killing occurred even though the firearm was not
the instrument of death in the homicide.
The state further tries to avoid the problem of the duplication of aggravating circumstances when robbery and homicide for
pecuniary gain are considered by arguing factually that Parsons
committed the offense for pecuniary gain.

In fact, an examina-

tion of the state's argument, at page 40, shows no citation to
the record that there was any evidence that the offense was
committed for pecuniary gain other than Parsons had the victim's
wallet, car, and personal effects after the offense. As pointed
out in the principal brief, robbery for the purpose of obtaining
13

money or property is not pecuniary gain within the meaning of the
statute at issue.

See People v. Adcox, 763 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1988).

The fact remains that the blending together of aggravating
circumstances in the instructions with circumstances justifying
alone imposing the death penalty was misleading and clearly had
the potential of construing deliberation toward imposition of the
death penalty.

Failure to identify and object to these issues

was a substantial error on the part of the defense counsel which
merits reversal of the sentence.
D. STRICKLAND SHOULD NOT BE
STRICTLY APPLIED TO THIS CASE
One of the major themes of the state in responding to all of
the issues concerning ineffective assistance of counsel is to
seek safe harbor in the requirements of Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984).

Strickland applies a two prong test for

ineffective assistance of counsel.

The first prong requires the

defendant to show that there was some error in the defense with
the second prong requiring the defendant to show that prejudice
affecting the outcome occurred.
Parsons admits in his principal brief that Strickland could
be barrier to his claims made here and confronts the issue headon by asking this court to not apply Strickland in the circumstances presented.

Not unexpectedly, the state argues that

Strickland should control because Parsons fails to make a clear
showing that the outcome would have been different with respect
to certain issues.
14

Strickland is conceptually quite appealing on its face.

It

makes for easy memorized rules that resolve a number of cases in
hornbook fashion.

The problem is that Strickland breaks down in

the reality of the situation in which Mr. Parsons finds himself.
The record clearly shows that Mr. Parsons is an indigent person
incarcerated on Utah's death row, dependent upon pro bono appointed counsel, who is a civil litigator advised by one of the
state's busiest criminal defense attorneys.

The imposition of

the second prong of Strickland under these circumstances is
unconscionable and does not measure up to fundamental notions of
fair play and justice.

The following matrix is offered to show

the impact of Strickland in a practical sense on Parsons:
PARSONS
PRACTICAL POSITION
Counsel was not
present, never objected, additional
interviews are needed
in southern Utah and
California, in prison, indigent.

ISSUE
1. Taking of
depositions,

STRICKLAND REQUIRES
Counsel would have
impeached statements
at time of deposition,

2. No investigation was
made.

The investigation
would have turned up
exculpatory information.

No real investigation
was done, in prison,
no money, trail grows
cold.

3. Advice to
plead guilty
inappropriate.

Defendant would not
have pled guilty.

Strickland requirement met — Parsons
own testimony and
supporting testimony
of expert at trial.

4. Juror/
witness contact.

Juror was influenced
by contact with witness.

Counsel did not explore at trial fully,
interviews needed, in
prison, indigent.

15

5. No discovery
requests
were made.

Discovery requests
would have produced
material evidence.

No motion having been
made, right to find
out anything has been
forever waived under
State v. Booker, 709
P.2d 342 (Utah 1985),
no resources for investigation.

Preliminary
hearing
waiver

Would not have pled
guilty.

Strickland met —
Parsons own testimony, evidence of duress, and statements
of expert at Third
District trial.

Counsel unprepared

Outcome would have
been different.

Can only be shown
through adequate investigation, in prison, indigent.

Venue —
jury voir

Jury was biased by
pretrial information,

Counsel did not ask
what they heard after
admitted hearing
something, opportunity to question forever lost.

Special Verdict Form

Deliberations wrongfully construed toward
death.

Counsel did not object, but Strickland
met — instructions
and verdict form are
patently defective.

dire

Put at it most basic, Strickland just does not work in all
cases.

There are, no doubt, a number of issues in which a

defendant might reasonably be expected to show that the act or
failure to act of his defense counsel would have changed the
outcome.

State v. Tempiinf 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), which

incorporates Strickland into Utah jurisprudence, is an example of
where the standard could be met because of the complete failure
to investigate.

The issues faced by Parsons as an indigent

person, with pro bono counsel in prison without resources are not
subject to a showing of a different outcome absent the investment
16

of resources.

Practical problems, such as having forever missed

the opportunity to conduct a proper jury voir

dire

cannot be

addressed in a reasonable manner because the jurors have been
dismissed.

Only an objective review of the process gives a fair

test of the issue.
This court is asked to make a reasonable application of the
Strickland second prong by modifying it to consider the nature of
the issue raised and the relative practical ability of an accused
to address the issue.
E.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IS IN PLACE
FOR STATE PROVIDED COUNSEL

Page 45 of the state's brief, which accuses Parsons of
providing "no legal analysis11 and engaging in a "ploy" in the
presentation of the argument made cries for a response.
An examination of Parsons' principal brief at pages 4 2 - 4 5
shows that he identifies those federal cases which were invoked
in the lower court by the state as support for the proposition
that there is no right in a habeas corpus proceeding for counsel
provided by the state.

Contrary to the statement that there is

no legal analysis of these cases, a review of those pages shows
that there is specific recognition of the holding of the cases
and they are distinguished.

The author of the brief then leaves

it to the state to make its own argument after distinguishing the
cases.

Rather than being a ploy, an ethical obligation was met

to identify seemingly relevant contrary authority.

17

In Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), an indigent
prisoner petitioned for post-trial relief raising identical
issues that were raised in the direct appeal.

Interestingly, the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that she was entitled under state
law to appointed counsel in her post-conviction proceedings.
That counsel withdrew finding that the issues raised by his
client were frivolous and another appointed counsel successfully
argued to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that the first counsel
improperly withdrew under the standards of Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967).
The Supreme Court rejected the application of Anders to the
claims made because Anders assumed an underlying right to appointed counsel. The Supreme Court stated that it had never held
that prisoners mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions
were entitled under the Constitution to a right to appointed
counsel.
A reading of the Supreme Court's analysis shows that they
place heavy emphasis in their decision on the fact that the
underlying action was a "discretionary appeal".
The case is distinguishable because the state actually
provided appointed counsel.

There is, admittedly, dicta suggest-

ing that there is no federal obligation to provide counsel for a
so-called discretionary appeal. This dicta loses force because
of the presence of appointed counsel and because the issue
considered was whether the earlier counsel had wrongfully withdrawn.

The case does not involve the direct request by an
18

accused person for appointed counsel in a state granted habeas
corpus proceeding where access to habeas corpus relief exists as
a matter of right under the state constitution.
Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989), appears on its face
supportive of the state's position here.

There, an inmate under

a sentence of death brought a federal civil rights action against
the state of Virginia claiming that his rights had been violated
for the failure of the state to provide him counsel for state
post-conviction relief.

The court refers to Finley and states

that neither the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
nor the Equal Protection Clause requires a state to appoint
counsel for indigent prisoners seeking state post-conviction
relief.
Murray v. Giarratano is essentially a five/four decision but
has four opinions issued.

The question of a federal requirement

of appointed attorney for post-trial relief is obviously an
uncertain one. The case does not discuss the impact of habeas
corpus relief being available as a matter of right in the state
constitution as contained in the Utah Constitution.

The majority

opinion clearly talks in terms of discretionary appeals in the
state's system as being relatively insignificant for constitutional considerations.
Parsons suggests to this court that the door is left open
for the court to analogize to those federal cases which hold that
where a first appeal of right is given, states are obligated
under the federal constitution to appoint counsel to allow
19

meaningful access to the system.

Granting of a right to habeas

corpus in Article I, Section 5, of the Utah Constitution takes
the proceeding in this state out of the realm of an act of grace
by the state into a right of substance.
As Justice Stewart explained in Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029
(Utah 1989), habeas corpus relief in Utah holds a special role in
Utah jurisprudence.

Habeas corpus is as important in the context

of a proceeding claiming ineffective assistance of counsel when
the original defense counsel was the same counsel for direct
appeal as a direct appeal.

A defendant convicted contrary to

constitutional principles has no meaningful relief in these
circumstances other than the right to habeas corpus relief.
As pointed out in the principal brief, the state constitution also provides framework for requiring the state to provide
counsel in habeas corpus matters.

The right to habeas corpus in

Article I, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution is contained in the
same article as the right to direct appeal in Section 12 of
Article I.

From a convicted person's point of view, relief

obtained from direct appeal or from attack through the right of
habeas corpus is indistinguishable.

Both routes take one to the

same courts to consider fundamental constitutional issues. It
defies logic to find a fundamental right under Section 12 of
Article I which requires the appointment of counsel while not
applying the same right for a substantially similar right found
in Section 5.

See, State v. Johnsonf 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981).
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Other states have found that their constitution guarantees
equal access for post-trial relief through appointed counsel.

In

Nichols v, State, 425 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1967), the state constitution was held to require appointed counsel.
State, 751 P.2d 507 (Alaska App. 1988).

See also, Roberts v.

Kansas also so held

under both the federal and state constitutions in State f ex

rel.

Stephen v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816 (Kan. 1987).
This court is respectfully requested to hold that which is
fundamentally fair.

This court is asked to find that where there

is a state granted right of habeas corpus relief that stands on
an equal footing under the state constitution with the first
direct appeal that the federal Constitution requires equal access
to the system.

The court is further respectfully requested to

find that the state constitution requires the appointment of
counsel for the first exercise of the right of habeas corpus in a
capital homicide case.
CONCLUSION
This court is respectfully requested to vacate the sentence
of death of Mr. Parsons.
DATED this

<2(* ~ day of February, 1993.
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C.

GREGORY<3V S^N£>ERS, ESQ.
KIRK G. GIBBS, ESQ.
RONALD J. YENGICH, ESQ.
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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A
§68-3-12,

U.CA.

68*3-12. General rules.
In the construction of these statutes the following rules shall be observed,
unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the
Legislature or repugnant to the context of the statute:
(1) "Month" means a calendar month, unless otherwise expressed, and
the word "year," or the abbreviation "A.D." is equivalent to the expression "year of our Lord."
(2) "Oath" includes "affirmation," and the word "swear" includes "affirm." Every oral statement under oath or affirmation is embraced in the
term "testify," and every written one, in the term "depose."
(3) "Signature" includes any name, mark, or sign written with the
intent to authenticate any instrument or writing,
(4) "Writing" includes printing, handwriting, and typewriting.
(5) "Person" includes individuals, bodies politic and corporate, partnerships, associations, and companies.
(6) The singular number includes the plural, and the plural the singular.
(7) Words used in one gender comprehend the other.
(8) Words used in the present tense include the future.
(9) "Property" includes both real and personal property.
(10) "Land," "real estate," and "real property" include land, tenements,
hereditaments, water rights, possessory rights, and claims.
(11) "Personal property" includes every description of money, goods,
chattels, effects, evidences of rights in action, and all written instruments
by which any pecuniary obligation, right or title to property is created,
acknowledged, transferred, increased, defeated, discharged, or diminished, and every right or interest therein.

B
§ 7 6 - 5 - 2 0 2 , U.C.A.

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first degree if the actor
intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another under any of the fol*
lowing circumstances:
(a) The homicide was committed by a person who is confined in a jail or
other correctional institution,
(b) The homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme, course of
conduct, or criminal episode during which two or more persons are killed.
(c) The actor knowingly created a great risk of death to a person other
than the victim and the actor.
/
(d) The homicide was committed while the actor was engaged in the
commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or
attempting to commit, aggravated robbery, robbery, rape, rape of a child,
object rape, object rape of a child, forcible sodomy, sodomy upon a child,
sexual abuse of a child, child abuse of a child under the age of 14 years, as
otherwise defined in Subsection 76-5-109(2Xa), or aggravated sexual assault, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated burglary, burglary, aggravated kidnaping, kidnaping, or child kidnaping.
(e) The homicide was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing an arrest of the defendant or another by a peace officer acting under
color of legal authority or for the purpose of effecting the defendants or
another's escape from lawful custody.
(f) The homicide was committed for pecuniary or other personal gain.
(g) The defendant committed, or engaged or employed another person
to commit the homicide pursuant to an agreement or contract for remuneration or the promise of remuneration for commission of the homicide.
(h) The actor was previously convicted offirstor second degree murder
or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person. For the
purpose of this paragraph an offense committed in another jurisdiction,
which if committed in Utah would be punishable as first or second degree
murder, is deemed first or second degree murder.
(i) The homicide was committed for the purpose of: (i) preventing a
witness from testifying; (ii) preventing a person from providing evidence
or participating in any legal proceedings or official investigation; (iii)
retaliating against a person for testifying, providing evidence, or participating in any legal proceedings or official investigation; or (iv) disrupting
or hindering any lawful governmental function or enforcement of laws.
(j) The victim is or has been a local, state, or federal public official, or a
candidate for public office, and the homicide is based on, is caused by, or is
related to that official position, act, capacity, or candidacy.
(k) The victim is or has been a peace officer, law enforcement officer,
executive officer, prosecuting officer, jailer, prison official, firefighter,
judge or other court official, juror, probation officer, or parole officer, and
the victim is either on duty or the homicide is based on, is caused by, or is
related to that official position, and the actor knew or reasonably should
have known that the victim holds or has held that official position.
(1) The homicide was committed by means of a destructive device,
bomb, explosive, infernal machine, or similar device which the actor
planted, hid, or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building, or structure, or mailed or delivered, or caused to be planted, hidden, concealed,
mailed, or delivered and the actor knew or reasonably should have known
that his act or acts would create a great risk of death to human life.
(m) The homicide was committed during the act of unlawfully assuming control of any aircraft, train, or other public conveyance by use of
threats or force with intent to obtain any valuable consideration for the
release of the public conveyance or any passenger, crew member, or any
other person aboard, or to direct the route or movement of the public
conveyance or otherwise exert control over the public conveyance.
(n) The homicide was committed by means of the administration of a
poison or of any lethal substance or of any substance administered in a
lethal amount, dosage, or quantity.
(o) The victim was a person held or otherwise detained as a shield,
hostage, or for ransom.
(p) The actor was under a sentence of life imprisonment or a sentence
of death at the time of the commission of the homicide.
(q) The homicide was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious,
cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner, any of which must be demon*_A-J u.. •**, «..;*•! f/irfiirA oprimis nhvsical abuse, or serious bodily in-
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76-8-502. False or inconsistent material statements.
A person is guilty of a felony of the second degree if in any official proceeding:
(1) He makes a false material statement under oath or affirmation or
swears or affirms the truth of a material statement previously made and
he does not believe the statement to be true; or
(2) He makes inconsistent material statements under oath or affirmation, both within the period of limitations, one of which is false and not
believed by him to be true. In a prosecution under this section, it need not
be alleged or proved which of the statements is false but only that one or
the other was false and not believed by the defendant to be true.

D
Utah Constitution
Article I, Section 5 and
Article I, Section 12

ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS

Sec. 5. iHabeas corpus,]
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in
case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it

See. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy foi the same offense.
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